There is no invariant, four-dimensional stuff by Halvorson, Hans
There is no invariant, four-dimensional stuff
Hans Halvorson
May 30, 2019
I’ve heard a few philosophers say that Einstein’s special theory of rel-
ativity (STR) favors a four-dimensional ontology. They say that in STR,
four-dimensional stuff is invariant in some sense that three-dimensional stuff
is not. For example, Balashov claims that “an object viewed as a 4d being
is relativistically invariant in a sense in which its 3d parts are not” (1999,
p 659).1 Similarly, Sattig says that “there is a permanent shape stand-
ing behind the different three-dimensional shapes of the object, namely, an
invariant four-dimensional shape, rendering the various three-dimensional
shapes different perspectival representations of the single invariant shape”
(2015, p 220). Finally, Hofweber and Lange argue against Kit Fine’s frag-
mentalist interpretation of STR on the basis that “the spacetime interval, as
a frame-invariant fact, is the reality, whereas the facts related by the coordi-
nate transformations are frame-dependent facts and hence are appearances
of that reality” (2017, p 876).
In this note, I show that these philosophers are operating with a false
picture of invariance and frame-dependence in STR. First I show the pre-
cise sense in which there are no invariant four-dimensional objects. Then I
explain why it’s misleading to say that facts about the spacetime interval
are frame-invariant.
I begin with a couple of definitions. First, a 4d object is represented
by a four-dimensional subset of Minkowski spacetime. For simplicity, I will
assume that a 4d object is represented (in some coordinate system) by a
region of the form R × I, where I is the unit cube. The result proven
below is easily generalizable to other regions that might represent 4d objects.
Second, an object O is relativistically invariant just in case O is invariant
under Lorentz transformations.
1Balashov’s claim was contested by Davidson (2013), who argues that 4d objects them-
selves fail to be relativistically invariant. However, Balashov (2014) and Calosi (2015)
argue that Davidson’s conclusion and the reasoning behind it are in error. I show here
that Davidson’s conclusion is correct.
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The following result rules out the existence of invariant four dimensional
objects.
Proposition. For any region O of Minkowski spacetime representing a 4d
object, there is a Lorentz transformation L such that L(O) 6= O.
Proof. The idea behind the proof is simple: fix p ∈ O, and consider Lorentz
boosts centered at p. If q ∈ O and q is spacelike separated from p, then the
orbit of q under these Lorentz boosts is an infinite hyperboloid that cannot
be contained within O. Thus, there is a Lorentz boost L such that L(q) 6∈ O.
For more precision, consider the case of two-dimensional Minkowski
spacetime, where I = [0, 1] is the unit interval, and let p = 〈0, 0〉 ∈ O. The
action of a Lorentz boost Lv centered at p transforms a point 〈t, x〉 to a point
〈t′, x′〉, where x′ = (1 − v2
c2
)−1/2x. In particular, Lv transforms 〈0, 1〉 ∈ O
to a point with x-coordinate x′ = (1 − v2
c2
)−1/2. Clearly, this x-coordinate
grows unboundedly large as v approaches c. Therefore L(O) 6= O.
Thus, there is nothing in Minkowski spacetime that could be called a
physical object — whether three or four dimensional — and that is rela-
tivistically invariant.
We now turn our attention to facts. Hofweber and Lange claim that
the spacetime interval is an invariant fact. But depending on how we dis-
ambiguate “spacetime interval,” either it’s not a fact, or it’s not invariant.
Let’s write η(p, q) for the spacetime distance between two events p, q. Of
course, the Minkowski metric η itself is invariant under Lorentz transfor-
mations. But η is not a fact, nor is it used (without inputs) to repre-
sent a fact.2 What’s more, to say that η is Lorentz invariant means that
η(p, q) = η(Lp,Lq) for any Lorentz transformation L. But events like p and
q are not relativistically invariant; i.e. usually Lq 6= q. Hence “the spacetime
interval between events p and q” is not invariant. The correct thing to say
is that the distance between events (say p and q) is the same as the distance
between Lorentz-related events (say Lp and Lq). But a distance by itself is
neither a thing nor a fact.
Let’s try to be charitable. What Hofweber and Lange probably mean is
that the spacetime distance between events is something that all observers
can agree upon. But what does it mean to say that all observers can agree
2As a contravariant tensor, η is a function from pairs of vectors to numbers. Physicists
do not take functions (without inputs) as representing facts. For example, physicists
don’t think of the dot product between two vectors as a fact. In contrast, physicists do
use equations such as η(p, q) = r to represent facts. But that equation is not invariant
under Lorentz transformations.
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on this fact? We have already seen that it does not mean that the fact is
invariant. What’s more, a fact doesn’t have to be invariant for all observers
to agree upon it. For example, all observers can agree upon the spatial
distance between two events, relative to a spacelike hypersurface Σ that
contains both events. Perhaps, though, the former fact is somehow intrinsic
to Minkowski spacetime, i.e. it’s a relation that the events bear to each
other merely in virtue of their being events in Minkowski spacetime. (One
might be tempted to suggest that it’s a “frame-independent fact”.) But here
is another relation that these events bear to each other merely in virtue
of their being events in Minkowski spacetime: they are contained in the
spacelike hypersurface Σ, and they have a certain spatial distance within
this hypersurface.
In conclusion, it’s simply not true that invariance features of Minkowski
spacetime favor a four-dimensional ontology over a three-dimensional ontol-
ogy.
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